# NDT Round 1 – Neg v. UNT QS

## 1NC

**Darnall** Moore explains that…

(Darnell L. Moore 2011, writer and activist whose work is informed by anti-racist, feminist, queer of color, and anti-colonial thought and advocacy. Darnell's essays, social commentary, poetry, and interviews have appeared in various national and international media venues, including the Feminist Wire, Ebony magazine, and The Huffington Post, "On Location: The “I” in the Intersection," http://thefeministwire.com/2011/12/on-location-the-i-in-the-intersection/)

The most general statement of our politics at the present time would be that we are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class oppression and see as our particular ask the development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking. The synthesis of these oppressions creates the conditions of our lives. As black women we see black feminism as the logical political movement to combat the manifold and simultaneous oppressions that all women of color face. -The Combahee River Collective in A Black Feminist Statement Many radical movement builders are well-versed in the theory of intersectionality. Feminists, queer theorists and activists, critical race scholars, progressive activists, and the like owe much to our Black feminist sisters, like The Combahee River Collective, who introduced us to the reality of simultaneity–as a framework for assessing the multitude of interlocking oppressions that impact the lives of women of color–in A Black Feminist Statement (1978). Their voices and politics presaged Kimberlé Crenshaw’s very useful theoretical contribution of “intersectionality” to the feminist toolkit of political interventions in 1989. Since its inception, many have referenced the term—sometimes without attribution to the black feminist intellectual [genealogy](http://thefeministwire.com/2011/12/on-location-the-i-in-the-intersection/) from which it emerged—as a form of en vogue progressive parlance. In fact, it seems to be the case that it is often referenced in progressive circles as a counterfeit license (as in, “I understand the ways that race, sexuality, class, and gender coalesce. I get it. I really do.”) to enter resistance work even if the person who declares to have a deep “understanding” of the connectedness of systemic matrices of oppression, themselves, have yet to discern and address their own complicity in the maintenance of the very oppressions they seek to name and demolish. I am certain that I am not the only person who has heard a person use language embedded with race, class, gender, or ability privilege follow-up with a reference to “intersectionality.” My concern, then, has everything to do with the way that the fashioning of intersectionality as a political framework can lead toward the good work of analyzing ideological and material systems of oppression—as they function “out there”—and away from the great work of critical analyses of the ways in which we, ourselves, can function as actants in the narratives of counter-resistance that we rehearse. In other words, we might be missing the opportunity to read our complicities, our privileges, our accesses, our excesses, our excuses, our modes of oppressing—located “in here”—as they occupy each of us. Crenshaw’s theorization has provided us with a useful lens to assess the problematics of the interrelated, interlocking apparatuses of power and privilege and their resulting epiphenomena of powerlessness and subjugation. Many have focused on the external dimensions of oppression and their material results manifested in the lives of the marginalized, but might our times be asking of us to deeply consider our own “stuff” that might instigate such oppressions? What if we extended Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality by invoking what we might name “intralocality”? Borrowing from sociologists, the term “social location,” which broadly speaks to one’s context, highlights one’s standpoint(s)—the social spaces where s/he is positioned (i.e. race, class, gender, geographical, etc.). Intralocality, then, is concerned with the social locations that foreground our knowing and experiencing of our world and our relationships to the systems and people within our world. Intralocality is a call to theorize the self in relation to power and privilege, powerlessness and subjugation. It is work that requires the locating of the “I” in the intersection. And while it could be argued that such work is highly individualistic, I contend that it is at the very level of self-in-relation-to-community where communal transformation is made possible. Might it be time to travel into the deep of our contexts? Might it be time for us—theorists/activists—to do the work of intersectionality (macro/system-analysis) in concert with the intra-local (micro/self-focused analysis)? Intersectionality as an analysis, rightly, asks of us to examine systemic oppressions, but in these times of radical and spontaneous insurgencies—times when we should reflect on our need to unoccupy those sites of privilege (where they exist) in our own lives even as we occupy some other sites of domination—work must be done at the level of the self-in-community. We cannot—as a progressive community—rally around notions of “progression” and, yet, be complicit in the very homo/transphobias, racisms, sexisms, ableisms, etc. that violently terrorize the lives of so many others. If a more loving and just community is to be imagined and advanced, it seems to me that we would need to start at a different location than we might’ve expected: self.

### Kuletz

**Kuletz 1998**

(Dr. Valerie Kuletz, Resident Scholar, academic research and lecturer at Oregon State University, The Tainted Desert: Environmental and Social Ruin in the American West, pg. 36-37).

The Global Picture

By 1982 uranium production had been greatly curtailed in the Grants Uranium Belt, since even cheaper sources had been found outside the continental United States. The same transnational energy corporations that played so signiﬁcant a role in the creation of the U.S. nuclear landscape are, of course, players in a larger global military economy in which uranium mining remains a requirement for the continuation of nuclear energy and weapons development. The extractive resources that fuel nuclear power are mined in many “Fourth World” lands, demonstrating further that nuclear colonialism follows a global pattern of exploitation. For example, as of 1980 “seventy percent of France’s uranium [came] from Niger and Gabon in west Africa.”3" Transnational energy corporations have reaped maximum proﬁts at the expense of many indigenous populations around the world. The uranium sacriﬁce zone has not been limited to the Grants Uranium Belt in the United States: Signiﬁcantly, large proportions of the uranium production and reserves controlled within the ﬁve developed nations are located either within internal colonies of those nations, such as Indian reservations in the United States and aborigine reserves in Australia, or in colonies or neocolonies which remain controlled by developed nations. All of these are colonies whose resources and labor are being exploited considerably by energy resource corporations. In Australia, it is estimated that 8o percent of all uranium reserves lie on aboriginal lands. Aboriginal people in Australia, like American Indians, were pushed on to the least desirable lands within nations and have been virtually forced into accepting miserable agreements with energy corporations. The 1978 agreement between the aborigines and the companies (Ranger Uranium Agreement) gave the aborigines only 4.25 percent of the revenues of the uranium mine royalties.” For many indigenous communities historically, as well as in many cases today, uranium mining is only a form of resource extraction for export. Because of this, native communities become “raw materials colonies” for the uranium companies and their home nation-states. The following list shows the aboriginal communities with the most signiﬁcant uranium reserves:

1. Australia—particularly the Arnhem Land Area of the Northern Territory, home to a large existing aboriginal community;

2. Canada--particularly in a northern Saskatchewan area inhabited by Cree-Dene Native Americans;

3. Southwest Africa (Namibia) —under South African mining concessions in the “last colony in Africa”;

4. United States—on Navajo, Laguna Pueblo, Havasupai, and Colville Confederated Tribal Lands, along with pre-1848 Hispanic Land Grants at Cebolleta and San Mateo Springs.” Also included are the Sioux lands in the Black Hills of Dakota, and the Spokane Reservation (30 miles upstream from the Yakima Reservation) in the state of Washington.

### Wise

**Wise 11**

Tim Wise April 13th 2011 Tim Wise and White Privilege <http://changefromwithin.org/2011/04/13/tim-wise-and-white-privilege/> [Wise served as an adjunct faculty member at the Smith College School for Social Work, in Northampton, Massachusetts, where he co-taught a Master’s level class on Racism in the U.S. In 2001, Wise trained journalists to eliminate racial bias in reporting, as a visiting faculty-in-residence at the Poynter Institute in St. Petersburg, Florida. From 1999-2003, Wise was an advisor to the Fisk University Race Relations Institute, in Nashville, and in the early ’90s he was Youth Coordinator and Associate Director of the Louisiana Coalition Against Racism and Nazism: the largest of the many groups organized for the purpose of defeating neo-Nazi political dear nidhi you are ;a cool cat and this candidate, David Duke. He graduated from Tulane University in 1990 and received antiracism training from the People’s Institute for Survival and Beyond, in New Orleans.]

¶ But as troubling as colorblindness can be when evinced by liberals, colormuteness may be even worse. Colormuteness comes into play in the way many on the white liberal-left fail to give voice to the connections between a given issue about which they are passionate, and the issue of racism and racial inequity. So, for instance, when environmental activists focus on the harms of pollution to the planet in the abstract, or to non-human species, but largely ignore the day-to-day environmental issues facing people of color, like disproportionate exposure to lead paint, or municipal, medical and toxic waste, they marginalize black and brown folks within the movement, and in so doing, reinforce racial division and inequity. Likewise, when climate change activists focus on the ecological costs of global warming, but fail to discuss the way in which climate change disproportionately affects people of color around the globe, they undermine the ability of the green movement to gain strength, and they reinforce white privilege. How many climate change activists, for instance, really connect the dots between global warming and racism? Even as people of color are twice as likely as whites to live in the congested communities that experience the most smog and toxic concentration thanks to fossil fuel use? Even as heat waves connected to climate change kill people of color at twice the rate of their white counterparts? Even as agricultural disruptions due to warming — caused disproportionately by the white west — cost African nations $600 billion annually? Even as the contribution to fossil fuel emissions by people of color is 20 percent below that of whites, on average? Sadly, these facts are typically subordinated within climate activism to simple “the world is ending” rhetoric, or predictions (accurate though they may be) that unless emissions are brought under control global warming will eventually kill millions. Fact is, warming is killing a lot of people now, and most of them are black and brown. To build a global movement to roll back the ecological catastrophe facing us, environmentalists and clean energy advocates must connect the dots between planetary destruction and the real lives being destroyed currently, which are disproportionately of color. To do anything less is not only to engage in a form of racist marginalizing of people of color and their concerns, but is to weaken the fight for survival.

#### USFG LINK

#### ALT

#### Vote negative to interrupt the mechanisms the 1AC has utilized to prevent the uncomfortable questioning of locating that piece of the oppressor deep inside all of us

Perucci explains that (Tony, ssistant Professor of Co mmunication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, "What the F uck is T hat? The Poetics of Ruptural Performance," Liminalities: A Journal of Performance Studies Vol. 5, No. 3, September 2009)

Recent years have seen a rise in the practice of political street performance. Often called “interventions” or “performance activism,” many of these actions exceed the transparent political messaging of traditional agit - prop performance. Rather, they mobilize the particular qualities of performance as embodied action — what I call “ruptural performance” — as a modality in opposition to the stultifying effects of the society of the sp ectacle. Drawing on Brechtian aesthetics and the Artaudian embodiment of “the poetic state” as well as the (a)logic of Dada and the materialism of Minimal Art, **ruptural performance enacts interruption, event, confrontation and bafflement as a form of direct action**. “ Every day, do something that won’t compute” — Wendell Berry, The Mad Farmer’s Manifesto 1 Much of today’s activism emerges out of an experience of the totality, of the intractability and intransigence of consumer culture, and of what Guy Deb ord once called “the society of the spectacle.” It is an aesthetic response to a political/cultural crisis, not to mention an ecological, psychic and economic one. This essay addresses what is particular to the performance of what are variously called “interventions” and “performance activism.” These actions’ characteristics as performance work in ways that are specific to their form and exceed any “message” or content that they might (or might not) seek to convey. The conditions of inequity and ecological disaster that are intrinsic to consumer culture are now an open secret – or not even a secret but an accepted fact of life. Perhaps this is even truer now in the face of what has been named “the current economic crisis,” which spurs the call to “drill baby drill” and sends Wal - Mart sales through the roof while the rest of the economy collapses. Ecological crisis and sweatshop labor are no longer concerns that we think we can afford to address in daily life. In the face of such conditions, Jacques Rancière points out the challenge of what he calls the dilemma of “critical art” thusly: “understanding alone can do little to transform consciousness and situations. The exploited have rarely had the need to have the laws of exploitation explained to them. Because it’s not a misunderstanding of the existing state of affairs that nurtures the submission of the oppressed, but a lack of confidence in their own capacity to transform it” (83). In what follows, I argue for and trace out the critical characteristics of this insurgent form of performance activism that I am calling “ruptural performance.” Ruptural performances are distinct less because of a communicated message of their content and more by their qualities as performance: they are interruptive, becoming - event, confrontational, and baffling. Understanding performance as rupture provides a significant way to think about and create interventionist and political performance that places the focus centrally on the act of performance. This emergent genre of performed activism pays a particular debt to the pranksterism of Abbie Hoffman, the d é tournement of the Situationists, and the absurd enactments of Dada performance. These performance interventions are best known today through the practice of culture jamming and by the staged performances of Reverend Billy and the Church of Stop Shopping, The Billionaires for Bush, and the Yes Men. Such interventions, as well as those by lesser - known artists (partly because their strangeness cannot be easily accommodated by media coverage, political activists and academic theorization), can be understood through the notion of “performance as rupture” (Perucci “Guilty” 315 - 329). Rupture itself is not a “new” element in culture, and it certainly has a long legacy in modernism as the bre ach, shift or break. But it has a particular resonance in current activist practices that are both freer and more delimited than previous such enactments. To define performance as rupture, we must articulate what it ruptures. At the risk of constructing a false binary, let me propose that the obverse of “performance as rupture” is Debord’s “spectacle.” Debord explains that while the society of the spectacle is indeed an “accumulation of spectacles ,” ( Society 12) he distinguishes that “The spectacle is not a collection of images; rather it is a social relationship between people that is mediated by images” ( Society 12). While he calls it a “weltanschauung” ( Society 13) it is more than an ideology or a veil of false consciousness. Rather it is “the very heart of society’s real unreality,” ( Society 13) and in that materiality extends the alienation of the production of the commodity to its consumption: the spectacle produces “isolation” through the shift from doing to “contemplation,” where “The spectator’s alienation from and submission to the contemplated object [...] works like this: the more he contemplates, the less he lives” ( Society 23). Ultimately, the spectacle as “social relationship” represents the triumph of the commodity - image, the “ruling order’s ... un interrupted monologue of self - praise” ( Society 19) where “the commodity completes its colonization of social life” ( Society 29). In understanding the spectacle as not merely spectacles, but a modality of experience, in which separation and contemplation fl atten the encounter with presence, Debord proposes “situations” specifically to intervene at the level of the experience. However, in his recent attempt to characterize the new activism, Dream: Re - imagining Progressive Politics in the Age of Fantasy , Steph en Duncombe proposes that spectacle is itself the basis for protest, and that the distinction of the spectacle and the situation is merely “semantic” (130). Instead, he proposes “the ethical spectacle”: **our spectacles will be participatory** , dreams the public can mold and shape themselves. They will be active : spectacles that work only if people help create them. They will be open - ended : setting stages to ask questions and leaving silences to formulate answers. And they will be transparent : dreams that one knows are dreams but which still have the power to attract and inspire. And finally, the spectacles we create will not cover over or replace reality and truth but perform and amplify it. (17, emphasis added) There is much to be gained from Duncombe’s schema tization here. And what I wish to do is revise and amplify it by challenging his dismissal of the distinctive character of “spectacle.” 2 As I have tried to show in my brief summary above, the spectacle is not just a thing to be seen, but is also a mode of performance . Interventionist performance, particularly that which seeks to challenge and disrupt the values and especially the experience of the society of the spectacle, is another modality of enactment rather than a variation of spectacle. While performa nce interventions share with spectacle the qualities of being dramatic and theatrical, what distinguishes them is that they disrupt the experience of daily life, a rupture of the living of social relations — what Reverend Billy of the Church of Stop Shopping calls “the necessary interruption” ( What Should I Do, xiii). The interruption, which Benjamin might call the “sudden start” or the “shock” (163), creates the space for and initiates the experience of a ruptural performance. While bearing in mind the promi sing schema laid out by Duncombe, but also taking into consideration the particular characteristics of the society of the spectacle upon which much “interventionist” work means to engage, I am calling for a proliferation of ruptural performances. Below is an attempt to trace out rupture as a “modality” of performance that means to disrupt, or at least, to fuck with the spectacle. Given Duncombe’s setting of “dreaming the impossible” (158) as a critical element of performance activism, I will introduce my sc hematic be means of an example from a fiction film. The 2004 film, Die Fetten Jahre Sind Vorbei ( The Fat Years are Over , released in the US as The Edukators , d. Weingartner) begins this way: an affluent German family returns to their home to discover a bre ak - in. Their first sign of trouble is a massive tower made of their dining room furniture. They gaze at the sculpture, frozen with bafflement. Nothing, however, has been stolen. But their many commodities have been humiliated: a porcelain bust is hanging f rom a noose, glass figurines are found stuffed in the toilet, the stereo is in the refrigerator, and finally a letter that says “Lesen!” (“Read! ” ). Inside reads the message from the anarchist group that reorganizes the possessions of wealthy residents: “Di e fetten Jarhre sind vorbei.” They stop and stare, confounded. 1. Ruptural performances are interruptive. In some way these performances halt, impede, or delay the habitual practices of daily life. They intervene at the level and in the midst of the quotidian. Such performances engage the “necessary interruption” which seeks to make conscious what is habitual so that it is available for critique. In this way it shares Debord’s notion of the con structed situation — “the concrete construction of temporary settings of life and their transformation into a higher, passionate nature” is inherently interruptive as it “asserts a non - continuous conception of life” (“Report” 48). They seek to destabilize wh at the Russian Formalist Viktor Shklovsky called the “automatism of perception” (13). For Shklovsky, the role of art is to undo “habitualization,” which he says, “devours works, clothes, furniture, one’s wife, and the fear of war” (12). Such a reclamation of perception Shklovsky calls “defamiliarization” (13), for which the Russian phrase is priem ostraneniye , and that translates literally as “making strange.” Brecht realized the political potential for this concept as the Verfremsdungeffekt , which is foundational in that it focuses on the experience of making the familiar strange as much as the transmission of a political message. In the speed - up of a contemporary life characterized by images and simulations, these performances engage what Walter Benjamin c alls the “interruption of happenings” that estranges the “conditions of life” (150). It is this interruption, Benjamin suggests, that allows performance to obtain the “special character [of] ... producing astonishment rather than empathy” (150). Interruptive performance, however, occurs not at the level of representation, but on the field of presence. It is achieved by “putting a frame” around experience (more in John Cage’s than Erving Goffman’s sense) that produces what Richard Bauman calls a “heightened in tensity” or “special enhancement of experience” (43). The Brazilian group, Opovoempé , 3 has performed their Guerrilha Magnética (Magnetic Guerilla) and other intervenções (interventions) throughout public spaces in São Paulo. In 2006, they composed and per formed Congelados (Frozen), a series of intervenções , throughout the city’s supermercados . The performances consisted of simple and improvised ensemble compositions constructed through the use of gesture, repetition, spatial relationship, and kinesthetic r esponse. 4 The piece, in its basic performance of the actions of shopping, defamiliarizes the activities of shopping. The “choreography” that constitutes the “dance and music of buying” only gr adually becomes evident, as the repetition of the banal gestures of shopping begins to mark their strangeness as performance (“Nos Supermercados” Esteves). 5 Though the content of the action is not overtly political (it does not scream its ideology), it ma kes the encounter with shopping, and especially its mindlessness and repetitiveness, seem strange. At its foundation, the pieces are rupture - producing machines : “ The interventions intend to cause rupture of communication barriers, revelation of humor and play, change in the use of public space, and the manifestation of latent contents or social tensions previously unnoticed” ( “What is” Esteves). That rupture is specifically political — particularly in mobilizing the poetic state of quotidian settings. Guerri lha Magnética performances are intended “to break apathy and indifference, to install a creative atmosphere of play and to reveal the poetic content of the city” ( “What is” Esteves). 2. Ruptural performanc es are becoming - events. That is, they do, as Dell Hymes suggests, “breakthrough into performance” (11). And while their boundaries are unstable and unfixed, it is the ruptural performances’ eventness, their status as singular in time and space, which enables the presencing that the spectacle confounds. Alain Baidou puts it this way: “This other time, whose materiality envelops the consequences of the event, deserves the name of a new present. The event is neither past nor future. It makes us present to the present” (39). And yet the instability of the boundaries of the event is equally significant. Ruptural performances tend to confound boundaries of the real and artificial. The actual event of performance is generated by means of artifice, in which audience s often don’t initially realize that they are in a performance. In ruptural performances, audiences often first suspect that something isn’t right, but are not sure if something is amiss. Ultimately, though, the “breakthrough” occurs that things aren’t nor mal, they are strange, and we are in the midst of an event. It is this eventness (and the anticipatory process of becoming event) that enlivens the occasion of the here and now. And that temporal immediacy is captured well by Benjamin’s invocation of Jetzt zeit or the “presence of the now” (261). One becoming - event that has been performed around the world is the “whirl.” The whirl consists of a group of fifteen or more people entering a sweatshop store a few at a time (most often a Wal - Mart, thus the someti mes - used moniker: “Whirl - Mart”) who move empty shopping carts throughout the store. Once all performers are inside and with carts, the participants create a single line of carts that snakes throughout the store, splitting and refiguring as the snake of car ts meets up with blocked aisles and shopping customers (which must look like a Busby Berkley dance sequence to the overhead security cameras). 6 During the hour or more of the performance, if asked by management, security, employees, or customers what they are doing, performers respond kindly with “I’m not shopping.” As performers make their rounds, it is the employees who first encounter the becoming - event, then the customers, then management (who begin manically communicat ing on walkie - talkies), and finally security. When security gets wise, it’s time to return the carts and exit the store. As ruptural performance, the whirl does not make any specific claim on protesting the many things one could advocate against — sweatshop labor, poor treatment of store employees, predatory business practices, etc. ad infinitum — given that all present could recite this litany of wrongs. Rather the whirl enacts the becoming - event of “not shopping,” which in itself can be read as an engagement against over - consumption, Wal - Mart’s imperialism, unfair labor practices, or ecological devastation. 7 3. Ruptural performances are confrontational. By this, I don’t necessarily mean aggressive, though they may be that. Rather, it is as Benjamin puts it, where a “stranger is confronted with the situation as with a startling picture” (151). Ruptural performance is thus distinguished from the “revelatory” performance that unmasks the hidden truths (though it may also do this). In our age, what Marx called the “secret of the commodity” — that its price masked the alienated labor that produced it — is now exposed. We know, for instance, that many of the products we buy are produced by sweatshop, child and slave labor; but we have developed what Adrian Piper calls “ways of averting one’s gaze” (“Ways” 167). Ruptural performance is thus less a critique of ideology or false consciousness, and is more about the experience of the encounter of returning one’s gaze to that which one avoids to maintain acceptance of the inequities of the contemporary social orders. As Husserl notes, “Things are simply there and just need to be seen.” Bruce Wilshire also gets at what I’m talking about when he describes phenomenology as a “systematic effort to unmask the obvious” (11). In fact, this quality is what Michael Fried complained about as the central quality minimal art: its “stage presence” or “theatricality” where “the work refuses, obstinately, to let him alone — which is to say, it refuses to stop confronting him” (140). And in this way, ruptural performance owes as much to Minimalism as it does to Dada. As such it enacts what Fred Moten suggests is not only an “excess of meaning” but also “the anti - interpretive nonreduction of nonmeaning” (197). Ruptural performances, like Minimal Ar t , are characterized by a “concrete thereness,” that Barbara Rose says is a “literal and emphatic assertion of their own existence” (216). As Rosalind Krauss says of Donald Judd’s work, we can say of Ruptural Performance: it “compels and gratifies immediat e sensual gratification” (211)

The apocalyptic imagining of climate change produces technological or treaty fixes which leave the root cause of environment destruction and makes other environmental problems seem acceptable and allows for species elimination, ocean destruction, deforestation, and other problems

Crist, 2k7 Eileen Crist, Associate Professor of Science and Technology Studies in the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies at Virginia Tech “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse” Telos 141 Winter 2007

While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planet’s ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the one issue that trumps all others.

Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve “the problem.” Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the sun’s rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his *The Revenge of Gaia*, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by “changing our whole style of living.”16 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, “the one lifeline we can use immediately.”17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. “The Montreal protocol,” he submits, “marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.”18 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem.

Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planet’s predicament. Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naïve not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, the root cause of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis—among numerous other catastrophes—climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can save itfrom impending tipping points.21

The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system.

In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisis—a crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global warming for biodiversity, 23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem losses—indeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate change may temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will not put an end to—will barely address—the ongoing destruction of life on Earth.

## 2NC

#### **New energy production exponentially increases consumption – doesn’t trade off and worsens the energy crisis**

Giberson 12 (Michael, Professor of Economics @ Rawls College of Business at Texas Tech, Head of Center for Energy Commerce at Texas Tech, "Efficiency, conservation, and the Jevons Paradox," <http://theenergycollective.com/michaelgiberson/91026/efficiency-conservation-and-inescapable-jevons-paradox>)

In his 1865 work The Coal Question, William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) expressed the concern that Britain would lose its economic dynamism and preeminence in the world due to an inevitable depletion of its reserves of easily mined coal. Of course he did not foresee the dominance of petroleum, even denying its likelihood, and so the central worry of the book turned out to be misplaced. But The Coal Question contains a gem that enshrines the book as among the most significant works of resource economics. That gem is know today as the Jevons Paradox. It cannot be expressed better than in Jevons’s own Victorian prose: It is wholly a **confusion of ideas** to suppose that the economical use of fuel is equivalent to a diminished consumption. The very contrary is the truth. (Jevons, 1866, p. 123) As a rule, new modes of economy will lead to an increase of consumption… (Jevons, 1866, p. 123) Now, if the quantity of coal used in a blast-furnace, for instance, be diminished in comparison with the yield, the profits of the trade will increase, new capital will be attracted, the price of pig-iron will fall, but the demand for it increase, and eventually the greater number of furnaces will more than make up for the diminished consumption of each. (Jevons, 1866, p. 124-125). In short, as **technological improvements increase** the efficiency with which a resource is used, **total consumption of that resource may increase** rather than decrease. This paradox has implications of the highest importance for the energy future of industrialized nations. It suggests that efficiency, conservation and technological improvement, the very things urged by those concerned for future energy supplies, may actually **worsen** our **energy prospects**. The Myth of Resource Efficiency, written by John M. Polimeni, Kozo Mayumi, Mario Giampietro, and Blake Alcott, examines the Jevons Paradox from several angles – everything from history of economic thought, to the methodological issues raised by measuring values over time, to application of complex adaptive systems thinking, to efforts to test empirically for efficiency-driven rebound and backfire effects. One of the points the authors make quite clearly is that there is more to the Jevons Paradox than the direct effect of more-efficient resource use on demand for that resource, there is an indirect effect as well. Tainter in his foreword illustrates the idea clearly in reference to a poll conducted in Sweden concerning the environmental effects of meat consumption. When asked, “If you were to eat less meat in your daily diet, what would you do with the money this saves?” the surveyed Swedes indicated that they would travel more. Tainter pointed out that travel comes with environmental costs, just as eating meat does. The energy efficiency policy implications are clear. Improvements in automobile fuel efficiency, for instance, reduce the cost of travel and would tend to lead to at least some additional travel and attendant fuel consumption. That additional travel will eat into some (or all, or more than all in extreme cases) of the conservation gains that might have been expected of the efficiency improvement. Yet beyond the direct rebound of improved fuel efficiency on fuel consumption, any consumer savings on fuel expense may also be spent other energy-resource-using activities. From the broad view of conservation policy, all such rebounds are relevant. It is not exactly an optimistic book, as the Vaclav Smil blurb on the back indicates, “it may leave an unsuspecting reader rather depressed.” Smil follows the remark with a “[but] it leaves all of us better prepared to face the reality.” The macro-scale **empirical work** reported in the book say “energy-efficient technological improvements will not work. Rather, energy-efficiency technology improvements are counter-productive, promoting energy consumption. Yet energy efficiency improvements continue to be promoted as a panacea.”

#### Plan is one step forward and two steps back – they don’t trade off with coal – nuclear power use compounds consumption – turns the case

**Foster et al, 10** (JOHN B. is editor of Monthly Review and professor of sociology, University of Oregon. BRETT CLARK is assistant professor of sociology, North Carolina State University. RICHARD YORK is co-editor of Organization & Environment and associate professor of sociology, University of Oregon, “Capitalism and the Curse of Energy Efficiency: The Return of the Jevons Paradox”, *Monthly Review*, November 2010. Vol. 62, Iss. 6; pg. 1, 12 pgs, proquest)

The Jevons Paradox was forgotten in the heyday of the age of petroleum during the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, but reappeared in the 1970s due to increasing concerns over resource scarcity associated with the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth analysis, heightened by the oil-energy crisis of 1973-74. As energy efficiency measures were introduced, economists became concerned with their effectiveness. This led to the resurrection, at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, of the general question posed by the Jevons Paradox, in the form of what was called the "rebound effect." This was the fairly straightforward notion that engineering efficiency gains normally led to a decrease in the effective price of a commodity, thereby generating increased demand, so that the gains in efficiency did not produce a decrease in consumption to an equal extent. The **Jevons Paradox** has often been relegated to a more extreme version of the **rebound effect**, in which there is a **backfire**, or a rebound of more than 100 percent of "engineering savings," **resulting in an increase rather than decrease in the consumption** of a given resource.30 Technological optimists have tried to argue that the rebound effect is small, and therefore environmental problems can be solved largely by technological innovation alone, with the efficiency gains translating into lower throughput of energy and materials (dematerialization). Empirical evidence of a substantial rebound effect is, however, strong. For example, technological advancements in motor vehicles, which have increased the average miles per gallon of vehicles by 30 percent in the United States since 1980, have not reduced the overall energy used by motor vehicles. Fuel consumption per vehicle stayed constant while the efficiency gains led to the augmentation, not only of the numbers of cars and trucks on the roads (and the miles driven), but also their size and "performance" (acceleration rate, cruising speed, etc.) - so that SUVs and minivans now dot U.S. highways. At the macro level, the Jevons Paradox can be seen in the fact that, even though the United States has managed to double its energy efficiency since 1975, its energy consumption has risen dramatically. Juliet Schor notes that over the last thirty-five years: energy expended per dollar of GDP has been cut in half. But rather than falling, energy demand has increased, by roughly 40 percent. Moreover, demand is rising fastest in those sectors that have had the biggest efficiency gains - transport and residential energy use. Refrigerator efficiency improved by 10 percent, but the number of refrigerators in use rose by 20 percent. In aviation, fuel consumption per mile fell by more than 40 percent, but total fuel use grew by 150 percent because passenger miles rose. Vehicles are a similar story. And with soaring demand, we've had soaring emissions. Carbon dioxide from these two sectors has risen 40 percent, twice the rate of the larger economy. Economists and environmentalists who try to measure the direct effects of efficiency on the lowering of price and the immediate rebound effect generally tend to see the rebound effect as relatively small, in the range of 10 to 30 percent in high-energy consumption areas such as home heating and cooling and cars. But once the indirect effects, apparent at the macro level, are incorporated, the Jevons Paradox remains extremely significant. It is here at the macro level that scale effects come to bear: improvements in energy efficiency can **lower the effective cost** of various products, propelling the overall economy and **expanding overall energy use**.31 Ecological economists Mario Giampietro and Kozo Mayumi argue that the Jevons Paradox can only be understood in a macro-evolutionary model, where improvements in efficiency result in changes in the matrices of the economy, such that the overall effect is to **increase scale and tempo** **of the system** as a whole.32 Most analyses of the Jevons Paradox remain abstract, based on isolated technological effects, and removed from the historical process. They fail to examine, as Jevons himself did, the character of industrialization. Moreover, they are still further removed from a realistic understanding of the accumulation-driven character of capitalist development. An economic system devoted to profits, accumulation, and economic expansion without end will tend to use any efficiency gains or cost reductions to expand the overall scale of production. Technological innovation will therefore be heavily geared to these same expansive ends. It is no mere coincidence that each of the epoch-making innovations (namely, the steam engine, the railroad, and the automobile) that dominated the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries were characterized by their importance in driving capital accumulation and the positive feedback they generated with respect to economic growth as a whole - so that the scale effects on the economy arising from their development necessarily overshot improvements in technological efficiency.33 Conservation in the aggregate is impossible for capitalism, however much the output/input ratio may be increased in the engineering of a given product. This is because all savings tend to spur further capital formation (provided that investment outlets are available). This is especially the case where core industrial resources - what Jevons called "central materials" or "staple products" - are concerned. The Fallacy of Dematerialization The Jevons Paradox is the product of a capitalist economic system that is unable to conserve on a macro scale, geared, as it is, to maximizing the throughput of energy and materials from resource tap to final waste sink. Energy savings in such a system tend to be used as a means for further development of the economic order, generating what Alfred Lotka called the "maximum energy flux," rather than minimum energy production.34 The deemphasis on absolute (as opposed to relative) energy conservation is built into the nature and logic of capitalism as a system unreservedly devoted to the gods of production and profit. As Marx put it: "Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets!"35 Seen in the context of a capitalist society, the Jevons Paradox therefore demonstrates the fallacy of current notions that the environmental problems facing society can be solved by purely technological means. Mainstream environmental economists often refer to "dematerialization," or the "decoupling" of economic growth, from consumption of greater energy and resources. Growth in energy efficiency is often taken as a concrete indication that the environmental problem is being solved. Yet savings in materials and energy, in the context of a given process of production, as we have seen, are nothing new; they are part of the everyday history of capitalist development.36 Each new steam engine, as Jevons emphasized, was more efficient than the one before. "Raw materials-savings processes," environmental sociologist Stephen Bunker noted, "are older than the Industrial Revolution, and they have been dynamic throughout the history of capitalism." Any notion that reduction in material throughput, per unit of national income, is a new phenomenon is therefore "**profoundly ahistorical**."37 What is neglected, then, in simplistic notions that increased energy efficiency normally leads to increased energy savings overall, is the reality of the Jevons Paradox relationship - through which energy savings are used to promote new capital formation and the proliferation of commodities, demanding ever greater resources. Rather than an anomaly, the rule that efficiency increases energy and material use is integral to the "regime of capital" itself.38 As stated in The Weight of Nations, an important empirical study of material outflows in recent decades in five industrial nations (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, and Japan): "Efficiency gains brought by technology and new management practices have been offset by [increases in] the scale of economic growth."39 The result is the production of mountains upon mountains of commodities, cheapening unit costs and leading to greater squandering of material resources. Under monopoly capitalism, moreover, such commodities increasingly take the form of artificial use values, promoted by a vast marketing system and designed to instill ever more demand for commodities and the exchange values they represent - as a substitute for the fulfillment of genuine human needs. Unnecessary, wasteful goods are produced by useless toil to enhance purely economic values at the expense of the environment. Any slowdown in this process of ecological destruction, under the present system, spells economic disaster. In Jevons's eyes, the "momentous choice" raised by a continuation of business as usual was simply "between brief but true [national] greatness and longer continued mediocrity. " He opted for the former - the maximum energy flux. A century and a half later, in our much bigger, more global - but no less expansive - economy, it is no longer simply national supremacy that is at stake, but the fate of the planet itself. To be sure, there are those who maintain that we should "live high now and let the future take care of itself." To choose this course, though, is to court planetary disaster. The only real answer for humanity (including future generations) and the earth as a whole is to **alter the social relations of production**, to create a system in which efficiency is no longer a curse - a higher system in which equality, human development, community, and sustainability are the explicit goals.

#### Their symptom-focused scholarship causes serial policy failure – sequencing the alt and rejecting the neutral portrayal of the 1AC is key to effective energy policy

**Scrase and Ockwell 10** (J. Ivan - Sussex Energy Group, SPRU (Science and Technology Policy Research), Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, David G - Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, SPRU, Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, “The role of discourse and linguistic framing effects in sustaining high carbon energy policy—An accessible introduction,” Energy Policy: Volume 38, Issue 5, May 2010, Pages 2225–2233)

There is a **dominant conception of policy-making as an objective, linear process**. In essence the process is **portrayed as** proceeding in **a series of steps from facts to analysis**, and then to **solutions** (for a detailed critique of this linear view see [Fischer, 2003](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib11)). In reality, **policy-making** is usually messy and political, **rife** with the exercise of **interests and power**. The **veneer of objective, rational policy-making**, that the dominant, linear model of policy-making supports is therefore cause for concern. It effectively sustains energy policy ‘business as usual’ and excludes many relevant voices that might be effective in opening up space to reframe energy policy problems and move towards more sustainable solutions (see, for example, [Ockwell, 2008](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib21)). This echoes concerns with what counts as knowledge and **whose voices are heard in policy debates** that have characterised strands of several literatures in recent decades, including science and technology studies, sociology of scientific knowledge, and various strands of the political science and development literatures, particularly in the context of knowledge, discourse and democracy. An alternative to the linear model is provided by a ‘**discourse’ perspective**. This draws on political scientists’ observations of ways in which politics and policy-making proceed through the use of language, and the expression of values and the assumptions therein. Discourse can be understood as: ‘… a shared way of apprehending the world. Embedded in language it enables subscribers to interpret bits of information and put them together into coherent stories or accounts. Each discourse rests on **assumptions**, judgements and contentions that provide the basic terms for analysis, debates, agreements and disagreements…’ [Dryzek (1997, p.8)](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib5). A discursive approach rejects the widely held assumption that **policy language is** a **neutral** medium through which ideas and an objective world are represented and discussed ([Darcy, 1999](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib4)). Discourse analysts examine and explain language use in a way that helps to **reveal the underlying interests**, value judgements **and beliefs** that are often **disguised by policy actors’ factual claims** and the arguments that these are used to support. For example UK energy policy review documents issued in 2006–2007 are criticised below for presenting information in ways that subtly but consistently favoured new nuclear power while purporting to be undecided on the issue.

#### Our role as energy policy researchers should be critiquing dominant conceptions of the policy process – it’s key to opening space for new ways of approaching energy policy

**Scrase and Ockwell 10** (J. Ivan - Sussex Energy Group, SPRU (Science and Technology Policy Research), Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, David G - Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, SPRU, Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, “The role of discourse and linguistic framing effects in sustaining high carbon energy policy—An accessible introduction,” Energy Policy: Volume 38, Issue 5, May 2010, Pages 2225–2233)

The demonstration of the value of a discourse analytic approach in this paper, together with other emerging contributions in this field (cited above), also serves to highlight some important considerations for energy policy researchers. **Moving away from the traditional linear understanding of the policy process** requires **researchers** to critically reflect on the interplay of values, beliefs, entrenched interests and institutional structures that serve to facilitate or constrain the policy traction of certain framings of energy policy **problems and solutions**. Further than this, it also highlights the role in this process that we ourselves play as researchers, and the extent to which our own values, beliefs and interests **influence the framing of our research** practice and communication. This has important and far reaching implications, both **methodological** and normative, raising considerations that are likely to continue to gain traction as researchers and policy makers alike increasingly appreciate the need for reflexivity in our approach to framing, interpreting and implementing energy policy in the decades to come.[2](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#fn2)

## 1NR

**Brent Henze suggests**

Though I argue against efforts to speak for those otherwise able to produce and enact liberatory agendas for themselves,¶ **“starting off thought” from the lives of the oppressed is useful for grounding the knowledge of outsiders¶ seeking to understand their own complex relations to systems of oppression. Outsiders cannot simply¶ investigate the effects of oppressive power structures in their own lives; on the contrary, their relationships to¶ the oppressed require them to understand systems of oppression from the perspective of the oppressed,¶ producing a less partial awareness of matrices of power, as well as their specific relationships with those¶ matrices** (including the broader implications of their experiences of enablement). **Only by becoming conscious of the¶ experiences** of the garment worker **can I properly understand my contribution to the power structure** that¶ incongruously yields me a T-shirt and yields the laborer a penny on every dollar I spend. **Without working to¶ understand her perspective, my own partial perspective is ineffectual. But by supplementing my perspective¶ with hers, I am enabled to make better-informed choices about my own actions—actions that resist or¶ contribute to the oppression that I may only witness secondhand.** Hence the first result of this approach is a more¶ suitable platform from which to understand and manage the effects of our own actions as they feed into and are shaped by¶ systems of power that oppress others. Instead of seeing our activity simply as a kind of transaction between ourselves and¶ a system of power (which we may manipulate to our benefit), we may become better able to understand the effects of our¶ involvement in relation to the involvement of others. In other words, **the standpoint of the oppressed is necessary to¶ manage our own involvement with systems of oppression so as most effectively to combat oppression as a¶ systemic yet particular effect of power.7¶**

**Herbert and Pavel 96**

(Nuclear Guardianship forum Issue #3, Spring 1994, page 16.

"Racism makes the continuing production of nuclear waste possible. If the white people who make decisions about nuclear waste felt that the people of color in poor areas are as valuable as the decision makers' own mothers and fathers and sons and daughters, would they continue to dump nuclear waste in those areas? If tailings from uranium mining were located next to the homes of investment bankers instead of the homes of indigenous people, would uranium mining continue? The continuation of the nuclear fuel cycle depends ... on the practice of human sacrifice. It depends on affluent whites deciding to risk the health and lives of people who are not affluent or white. This is what 'acceptable risk' often means in practice."

**Welsh 2k**

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Viewed from this perspective nuclear science constitutes a particular scientific social movement seeking to transform society through the acceptance of particular sets of knowledge claims and acceptance of the associated social and technical practices. Nuclear power can thus be regarded as the bearer of a particular scientific social movement's view of the desirable or good society. As Dant notes, from this perspective, practitioners' statements 'are framed, within particular contexts, to represent the beliefs of the speaker as true knowledge' (1991:153). By approaching nuclear science as a particular scientific social movement, harnessing the dominant cultural codes of a society to its particular knowledge claims, two objectives are achieved. First, we are reminded that this was but one scientific social movement amongst many. Second, it becomes possible to move beyond Yearley's conception of scientific social movement as a form of interest representation to embrace wider social, ethical and moral concerns. By recognising the existence of a plurality of scientific social movements, each prioritising discrete bodies of knowledge and techniques, one moves away from the idea of a unified body called science. As both McKechnie (1996) and Melucci (1992) comment this has the effect of rendering scientific knowledge as bricolage, a combination of cues, the meanings of which are dependent upon the social context of the observer. This has the effect of de-prioritising the foundationalist claims to superior knowledge which underpin many of the strands of legitimation surrounding the nuclear issue and prioritising the social contexts within which competing knowledge claims are read off (Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay 1983). The ascendancy of a particular science thus becomes a question of the degree of congruence between its knowledge claims and the social and ethical aspirations and priorities prevailing within a social formation. Being in tune with the prevailing Zeitgeist is a significant, though not sufficient, factor in enabling certain sciences and not others to become established as seemingly unstoppable industrial concerns. Scientific social movements compete with each other for resources, status and the achievement of particular visions of desired futures. The nuclear case provides an immensely rich basis through which to analyse empirically the kinds of discursive strategies deployed by a particular movement. It is my argument here that there are patterns and repetitions, a genealogy of symbolic forms, across time which offer a particularly powerful means of sociological engagement with science policy and science implementation.

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(“State of White Supremacy: Racism, Governance, and the United States” (Book Review) August 28, 2012, <http://www.darkmatter101.org/site/2012/08/28/book-review-state-of-white-supremacy-darkmatter-> journal/)

Here, the first two essays discuss racial discrimination in education. George Lipsitz provides a masterful reading of U.S. court cases (including a powerful rereading of Brown v. Board of Education) concerning racial discrimination in education to highlight how racism continues under the names equality, desegregation, and protection. As Lipsitz observes, the wording of Brown allows school districts to declare non-discriminatory intentions without taking reparative action. In this way, the state uses laws intended to end white supremacy in order to preserve it. Thus, the law (like the citizen and the human) is a not a vehicle of liberation but a tool of subjection. Lipsitz’s analysis of legal white supremacy authorized by Civil Rights legislation is complemented by the work of Sanford Schram, Richard Fording, and Joe Soss on what they term “neoliberal-paternalism.” Neoliberal paternalism apprehends the ways contemporary forms of poverty governance resurrect older modes of population management in order to connect them to more recent neoliberal modes of governance. Past forms of racialized state violence become sutured to newer forms of control and punishment. As more and more poor people of color abandoned by neoliberal restructuring are captured by an unprecedented regime of incarceration, welfare has increasingly mimicked the penal sphere. We might add the education system to the massive network of racialized state power outlined by Schram, Fording, and Soss. This almost unimaginable regime of racialized management and control produces a system where, as Joy James writes, “Whites are to be protected, and Black life is to be contained in order to protect whites and their property (both personal and public or institutional)” (169). These critiques of the state are powerfully extended by the work of Andrea Smith and João H. Costa Vargas in the book’s final section. Smith continues the collection’s critique of the law by observing that “genocide has never been against the law in the United States” because “Native Genocide has been expressly sanctioned as the law” (231). Like Rodríguez, Smith argues for a politics of abolition and undoing rather than reform and inclusion. In her analysis of hate crimes legislation, Smith argues that instead of making racialized and gendered violence illegal (given that racialized and gendered violence is already executed through the law in the prison, reservation, and the ghetto), we must make our organizing, theorizing, and teaching against the law. If the state is foundational to racialized, gendered, and heterosexist violence, then the state should not be the mediator of pain and grievance because “the state is now going to be the solution to the problem it created in the first place” (232). The work of João H. Costa Vargas complements this analysis by making clear the ways the law produces anti-black genocide. For Vargas, the black diaspora is a “geography of death” where the premature and preventable deaths of black people are authorized by a “cognitive matrix” that systematically renders black life devalued. Vargas would surely understand the preventable deaths produced by the medical industry as a form of genocide, namely because intent is not central to his theorization of the concept. Instead, creating or tolerating conditions that produce mass-based uneven vulnerability to premature death is genocidal, making white supremacy itself a genocidal project. Accordingly, genocide is at the core of our ethical standards, is foundational to modern politics, and is central to our cognitive apparatuses (269). To challenge genocide we must undo the epistemologies that support systems of value and disposability and make possible the slow deaths that are the “condition of possibility for our present subjectivities and modern politics” (269).